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  On locating the target he would take Admiral Hipper, (the faster of the two heavy ships) with three destroyers to make an initial attack from the northward. He could then reasonably expect the defending destroyers to concentrate against his squadron, while the now undefended convoy turned south, away from Hipper’s attack – to be decimated by the waiting Lützow and her destroyers (see map, p. 32). As with any battle plan there were problems to be considered. The attack would be made in the depths of the Arctic winter, in what would almost certainly be adverse weather conditions with very little daylight; communications would inevitably be haphazard, and the attacking force would be split into two squadrons operating 75–85 miles (138–156 km) apart. Exceptional navigating skills and not a little luck would be required for the two attacking squadrons to arrive at their respective positions at the right time.

  Operation Regenbogen – Admiral Kummetz’s plan of attack (Rodney L. Start, MBE, reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs Moira Start)

  —♦—

  The Royal Navy ‘O’ class destroyers Onslow, Obedient, (Lt-Cdr D.C. Kinloch, RN), Obdurate, (Lt-Cdr C.E.L. Sclater, DSC, RN), Oribi and Orwell (Lt-Cdr N.H.G. Austen, DSO, RN) operated in the Arctic from the start of the Russia convoys, and by December 1942 were old hands at the tricky and dangerous business of ‘riding shotgun’ for the lumbering merchant ships. However Captain Robert St Vincent Sherbrooke, DSO, RN, had been in command of Onslow and Captain (D) (senior officer) of the flotilla for a matter of weeks only. The close escort for the second section of the December convoy, JW51B, would be his first Arctic command. In addition to the five ‘O’s Sherbrooke would have at his disposal two destroyers from the Clyde Special Escort Force (a small reserve force of destroyers, based at Gourock, to strengthen convoy escorts when necessary), Achates (Lt-Cdr A.H.T. Johns, RN) and Bulldog plus the corvettes Hyderabad, RIN, (Lt S.C.B. Hickman, RNR) and Rhododendron (Lt-Cdr L.A. Sayers, RN), minesweeper Bramble (Cdr H.T. Rust, DSO, RN) and the trawlers Northern Gem (Lt H.C. Aisthorpe, RNR) and Vizalma which, in the absence of rescue ships, would assist with rescue work. The seven destroyers would come under the collective umbrella of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla.

  Captain Sherbrooke’s instructions to the escort and merchant ships in the event of a surface attack were clear and concise. On sighting the enemy, five destroyers led by Onslow were to make a concerted attack, while the two remaining destroyers and all other escorts were to place themselves in the best position to make smoke between the convoy and the enemy. The merchantmen would turn by signal to the reciprocal of the bearing of the enemy (away from the attack),[42] the rear echelons and any other ships which could manage it laying smoke floats to cover their departure. As they were used to working together as a unit, the five ‘O’ class destroyers would form the attack force, while the remaining two would assist the other units of the close escort in laying smoke. Crucially, and in some measure due to serious fuel shortages, the five-destroyer group would confine itself to turning the enemy away by feinting torpedo attacks, and, having turned the attackers away would fall back on the convoy. Given the limited number of torpedoes available, only if a particularly favourable opportunity presented itself would they actually be launched. With their torpedoes gone, the destroyers would be virtually helpless against an attack by German heavy ships. Nevertheless, due to the caution normally displayed by commanders of the big German warships when faced by torpedo attack, it was anticipated that this tactic would have good prospects of success.

  Captain Sherbrooke could obviously have had no knowledge of Vice-Admiral Kummetz’s plan, but it can be seen that the convoy defence does in some measure fall in with Kummetz’s expectations, with the vital exception that Sherbrooke rightly appreciated that the merchantmen were his principal concern, and had determined that the escort was not to be drawn too far from the convoy. The stage was therefore set for a lethal game of cat and mouse in the Arctic wastes.

  Under the command of Rear-Admiral Robert Burnett a detached covering force, designated Force ‘R’, comprising as flagship the light cruiser Sheffield (Capt. Arthur Wellesley Clarke, RN), plus the light cruiser Jamaica (Capt. Jocelyn Latham Storey, RN), and one or two destroyers if available, would shadow both JW51A and JW51B through the Barents Sea at some 50 or so miles (92 km), distance.[43] A force of heavy ships from the Home Fleet would also be at sea some 300–400 miles (552–742 km) to the west, with the usual standing orders not to proceed east of Bear Island unless good prospects for catching German surface raiders at sea materialised. Cover was also to be provided for homeward-bound convoy RA51, due to sail from Murmansk around 30 December. This would principally comprise the destroyers which brought out JW51A as they became available.

  —♦—

  Captain A.V. Radcliffe, RNR, Naval Control Service Officer at Loch Ewe, was not a happy man. Despite Admiralty assurances to the contrary, merchant ships were arriving at the loch unready for convoy service, placing a great strain on the limited resources available; and JW51B was no exception – the fifteen ships for this half of the convoy – British flag freighters Empire Archer, (the commodore’s ship, Capt. R.A. Melhuish, RIN), Daldorch, Dover Hill, Panamanian flagged (US owned) Ballot and Calobre, US flagged Chester Valley, Executive, Jefferson Myers, John H.B. Latrobe, Puerto Rican, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vermont, Yorkmar, and British flagged tankers Empire Emerald and Pontfield – all, with the exception of Puerto Rican and Pontfield, required some form of servicing. Executive, for example, had deck cargo damage, and required vegetables and 65 tons of water; Ralph Waldo Emerson required 150 tons of water and repairs to compasses and echo sounder, while the unhappy Dover Hill had both crew and engine troubles. In time-honoured tradition Captain Radcliffe arranged stores, sorted problems, and had the merchantmen ready to sail by the appointed day. He then settled down to compile another polite but frosty memo to the Director of Trade Division at the Admiralty.[44]

  —♦—

  JW51A sailed from Loch Ewe on 15 December with a close escort of similar composition to JW51B and Force ‘R’, including the destroyers Opportune and Matchless, in attendance at the required distance. The convoy had fine weather, passed south of Bear Island and arrived off the Kola Inlet on Christmas Day, unmolested and in fact undiscovered by German forces. Force ‘R’ arrived at Vaenga in the Kola Inlet one day ahead of the convoy to refuel[45] and make ready to depart at short notice to cover JW51B.

  —♦—

  With its precious cargo of 2046 vehicles, 202 tanks, 87 crated fighter aircraft, 33 crated bombers, 11,500 tons (11,684 tonnes) of fuel oil, 12,650 tons (12,852 tonnes) of aviation spirit, and 54,321 tons (55,190 tonnes) of general cargo (foodstuffs etc.),[46] JW51B slipped out of Loch Ewe late on 21 December into a crisp, clear night. Under the protective wing of Western Escort Group destroyers Blankney, Chiddingfold, Ledbury, and the minesweeper Circe, course was set for Seidisfjord on the eastern coast of Iceland, and the convoy was joined en route by elements of the close escort which would take it through to Murmansk – the corvettes Hyderabad and Rhododendron, the minesweeper Bramble and the trawlers Vizalma and Northern Gem. The 17th Destroyer Flotilla would join at Seidisfjord, where the Western Escort ships would depart.

  22 December saw JW51B at sea, the five ‘O’ class destroyers fuelling at Seidisfjord, and Achates, in company with Bulldog,[47] en route to Iceland. It was now that the good weather, and good luck, which had accompanied JW51A began to desert JW51B. The two Clyde Special Escort Force destroyers, maintaining a good 16 knots in order to arrive by the 23rd, were hit by a southerly gale, force 12 (wind velocity in excess of 60 knots), forcing Achates to heave to (slow right down and lie in the most comfortable and safe position), to ride out the storm. Bulldog also lay hove-to for several hours, but she had a new commanding officer – new to the ship and new to the Arctic – who, believing that the storm was abating, announced his intention to proceed. On Bulldog’s bridge, navigating officer Eric Rhead, together with the first lieutenant, advised against attempting to continue in
the existing conditions, particularly as the course to Seidisfjord lay across a very fierce sea. The commanding officer was adamant, however, and gave orders for the change of course and increased speed. Eric Rhead described the consequences:

  The inevitable happened and Bulldog charged into the gale… Most small ships have a breakwater on the forecastle as they normally ship a lot of water in bad weather at speed, and the breakwater just guides the water sideways back into the ocean. In our case the sea was too big, the speed to fast, with the result that the breakwater was just swept back, taking some five feet [1.52 m] of the forecastle deck with it, rather like opening a sardine tin. The crews quarters were swamped and indeed the ship was unsafe…[48]

  As a result of this incident Bulldog was forced to return to the UK, and the small destroyer escort for JW51B was down to six.

  JW51B found itself caught up in the same storm, which proved to be the last straw for Dover Hill, and she turned for home with weather damage and boiler trouble. The gale more or less blew itself out by the 24th and the weather cleared sufficiently for the Luftwaffe to launch reconnaissance missions that day. It is probable that this was the first inkling the Germans had of the convoy’s existence, as a patrolling Focke-Wulf 200 Condor long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft may well have spotted the ships at around 13.15 passing to the south of Iceland. Despite the unceasing efforts of her engine room personnel, Empire Archer proved to be an exceptionally bad ‘smoker’, which may have assisted the reconnaissance aircraft, and later U354, to home onto the convoy.

  Achates arrived at Seidisfjord at 11.30 on the 24th with a catalogue of thankfully minor storm damages, and berthed alongside an oiler to top up with fuel. At 23.00 the same day the six ships of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla weighed anchor and followed Onslow out of the fjord to join JW51B. With the storm now past, weaving strands of aurora borealis flickered across the clear sky and as Christmas Day dawned, the destroyers formed up in line abreast and set course to rendezvous with the convoy some 150 miles (276 km) to the east.[49]

  At 13.30 on Christmas Day the convoy was sighted, spread out in four columns and steering 320°. The 17th Destroyer Flotilla ships hurried stragglers into line, then took up their positions in the defensive screen, assisted by the Western Escort Group until nightfall when they were detached to Seidisfjord. By noon on the 26th the convoy was at 68°23’ N 6°32’ W, heading northward and crossing into the Arctic Circle at a steady 8½ knots. At these speeds destroyers encountered problems maintaining adequate steerage way, so would hold a speed some 2–3 knots faster but zigzag to an agreed pattern to maintain station with the merchantmen (and hopefully disrupt sightings by shadowing U-boats).

  Noon on the 27th saw the convoy at 70°48’ N, 00°22’ W, making 8 knots. The weather was calm but bitterly cold, and as the ships pressed further north into the Arctic the hours of daylight became less and less. Also on the 27th Force ‘R’ sailed from the Kola Inlet going as far west as 11° E by the 29th and overlapping the patrol line of the Home Fleet battle group (battleship Anson and heavy cruiser Cumberland, plus destroyers) which, this being the limit of their patrol area, had turned back at 04.00 that same day. Force ‘R’ arrived some hours later (see map A, p. 144), despatching the two destroyers homeward while Sheffield and Jamaica turned east once again, Admiral Burnett setting a course well to the south of the convoy route.[50] The departure of Force ‘R’ from Kola was picked up by German intelligence and the information passed to Vice-Admiral Kummetz, but once out into the Barents Sea the British ships were missed by reconnaissance patrols, and Kummetz believed that they might be positioning themselves to escort homeward-bound convoy RA51 which was then preparing to leave the inlet.

  By noon on the 28th JW51B was in position 72°35’ N, 4°20’ E, course 071°. During the night the wind had increased to force 7 from the north-west, icing up was becoming a problem and heavy rolling seas had reduced the convoy’s speed to 6½ knots. During the following night, the 28th/29th, the convoy was again struck by gale-force winds, now from north-north-west, and the ships experienced very heavy rolling. Several of the merchantmen encountered problems and Jefferson Myers was forced to heave to when her deck cargo came adrift (although Commodore Melhuish later stated that in his opinion to heave to and thus fall out of line was unnecessary, the problem, if anything, being inadequate stowage of deck cargo).[51] It was a problem which would recur, and as the gale continued into the morning of the 29th deck cargo also broke loose on Daldorch. Between 01.00 and 12.00 that morning visibility swung from three cables (600 yd/548 m), to 1½ miles (2.77 km). The noon position was 73°19’ N, 11°45’ E, and by that afternoon the gale had at last begun to abate and visibility had increased to 10 miles (18 km). Only nine merchant ships could be seen in company, in ragged order, and the trawler Vizalma and destroyer Oribi had also become detached from the main body during the night. As the weather continued to improve, Bramble, which had better radar equipment than most of the escort, was sent in search of stragglers and the speed of the convoy reduced to 6 knots to enable them to catch up. At 23.59 on the 29th course was altered to 090°, due east.

  PHOTO INSERT 1

  British flagged SS Daldorch, to which the convoy vice-commodore transferred after Calobre sustained splinter damage while under fire from Lützow (Photo: World Ship Society Photograph Library)

  SS Jefferson Myers, one of several US flagged merchant vessels with convoy JW51B (Photo: World Ship Society Photograph Library)

  Matilda tanks on the quayside at a British port, waiting to be loaded aboard merchant ships bound for Russia (Photo: IWM H 14786)

  Two Russian front-line nurses, Anya Vesnicheva and Antonia Dogina, enjoy chocolate sent from Britain. Nurse Anya, left, displays the medal awarded to her for exceptional bravery in the face of the enemy (Photo: IWM RUS 4293)

  2nd Lt J.P. ‘Paddy’ Donovan, shore leave, summer 1942 (Photo: Lt-Cdr J.P. Donovan)

  Paddy Donovan in full Arctic kit aboard HMS Obedient, winter 1942/3 (Photo: Lt-Cdr J.P. Donovan)

  The crew of ‘A’ HMS Sheffield – Midshipman Twiddy standing fourth from right (Photo: IWM A19971)

  Chipping ice from chains, wires, and bollards on the forecastle. Temperatures could plunge to –50 degrees Celsius, and the extreme frost would ‘weld’ ungloved hands to metal. (Photo: IWM A 6856)

  ‘There were no ENSA comedians or dancing girls in North Russia.’ Members of Sheffield’s crew put on some homegrown entertainment (Photo: Lt-Cdr A.W. Twiddy)

  Leading Stoker Walter Watkin, pictured on leave from HMS Onslow (Photo: Ldg Stoker Walter Watkin)

  Midshipman Albert Twiddy (left), shortly before joining HMS Sheffield, 1942 (Photo: Lt-Cdr A.W. Twiddy)

  The German pocket battleship Lützow, a formidable opponent for the convoy destroyer escort (Photeo: IWM HU1049)

  The German Narvik class destroyer Z30. Note single 5.9 in (146 mm) turret forward, instead of the excessively heavy twin turret with which a number of the class were fitted. (Photo: W.Z. Bilddienst)

  Lieutenant-Commander Heinrich Kaiser, the longest-serving commander of Z30 (Photo: Johann Hengel)

  ‘High up north, 13 November 1942.’ A cosy grog evening in the ‘U-room’, Z30. Johann Hengel far left (Photo: Johann Hengel)

  Ships of the German 5th (later 8th) Destroyer Flotilla against the spectacular backdrop of Narvikfjord

  Johann Hengel, right, on leave, February 1943 (Photo: Johann Hengel)

  CHAPTER 4

  FOG OF WAR

  Kapitänleutnant Karl-Heinz Herschelb and U354 shadowed JW51B from the morning of 30 December, and shortly after noon reported the convoy to Admiral Commanding Northern Waters Otto Kluber at Narvik, as ‘6–10 steamers Qu 6394 AB, enemy on course 100°. Poorly secured convoy protected by several destroyers up to one light cruiser.’[52]

  Later that afternoon Herschelb tried a torpedo attack, reporting: ‘Convoy in square AC 4189, widely spaced, large zigzags on a mean course of 080 degrees, about 10 steamships, several destroyers, 1 cruiser
doubtful. Spread salvo of three missed on account of zigzagging. Weather is good apart from short snow squalls.’[53]

  Covered by dark U354 surfaced on the starboard quarter of the convoy, tracking the merchant ships through hydrophones by the slow rhythmic churning of their propellers until another echo materialised, its source rapidly closing. This could only mean a destroyer approaching at high speed, and U354 slipped quickly beneath the waves.

  —♦—

  By 00.45 on the 30th word had come through to Captain Sherbrooke that Vizalma and the freighter Chester Valley were together, but some distance to the north of the main body of the convoy, which was itself 13 miles (24 km), south of its anticipated position thanks to the gale of the previous night. At 11.30 ships were sighted on bearing 200° 9 miles (16.7 km) distant and Obdurate was sent to investigate, returning by 14.00 with two of the missing freighters. The noon position was 73°27’ N, 19°35’ E, and speed was reduced to 8 knots to allow the missing ships to catch up. At 20.20 the alarm was sounded as Obdurate sped to investigate a possible submarine on the surface. She was joined by Obedient and both hunted the elusive echo and dropped depth charges, but were not convinced that it had been a submarine after all. They were also unable to contact Hyderabad, which should have been in a good position to join the hunt.[54] This would be the first of a number of communications problems with the corvette over the ensuing twenty-four hours. Most worrying for Sherbrooke, Oribi had still not rejoined. She had in fact been struggling with a defective gyrocompass and after trying vainly to find the convoy proceeded on to Murmansk. She would be badly missed; the destroyer escort was now down to five.